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CHAPTER NINE 
 
Development and Learning: Complementary or Conflicting 
Aims in Humanities Education? 
 
Robert D. Narveson 
 
 When we in ADAPT let it be known that cognitive development as defined by Jean 
Piaget was a central concern of our program, we found to our puzzlement that both high school 
and university counselors started sending us all sorts of academic basket cases. It took us a long 
time to figure out why. In fact the explanation did not really register with me until a short time 
ago when I attended a conference on freshman composition. There I heard the term 
“developmental” used in a sense quite different from the one I had found in our reading of 
developmental psychology. 
 
 Perhaps I was the last person in American education to discover what I discovered at the 
conference on composition, which was that in current educational usage “developmental” has 
replaced “remedial” in describing programs for students with academic deficiencies. I quickly 
verified that this has become common usage by examining some of the catalogues recently sent 
out by textbook publishers. In the most recent McGraw-Hill catalogue of English texts, for 
example, a section on developmental English leads the list, segregated from the following 
sections on composition, literature, and language. Unquestionably publishers such as McGraw-
Hill are attuned to the professions they serve, and have adapted their terminology accordingly.  
 
 A linguistic relativist, I bow to the majority and recognize this meaning of 
“developmental” as legitimate, much as I have had to accept that when most people say 
“disinterested” they mean “uninterested,” and not what I mean when I say “disinterested.” Still, I 
cannot resist musing over this strange shift of meaning. If developmental courses are for students 
who do not measure up to the norm of academic attainment, then the rest of the curriculum must 
be for those who do measure up. That is, it must be for the developed. We in ADAPT are not 
prepared to accept such a proposition. The findings of cognitive psychologists confirm the 
anecdotal experiences of most teachers that a large number of students in American colleges do 
not respond to problems demanding logical thinking in the ways that academic experience claims 
is necessary for academic success. Economics students often fail successfully to translate prices 
of goods in one currency into prices in another currency, or to understand supply-demand curves. 
In English classes students frequently seem not to understand that when the pronoun in a poem 
suddenly changes from "he" to "you", one should suspect a change in the person being referred 
to. Examples from mathematics, logic, and the sciences are legion. The common lament of 
teachers is, "if only our students knew how to think!" Many students apparently, need 
“developmental” teaching. Whether very many of the instructional methods in common use in 
American college classrooms are actually effective in teaching how to think is a matter that 
Piagetian theory, as we understand it, calls into question.  
 
 Just how would teachers go about teaching students to improve their thinking? Some 
philosophy professors propose that all students should be required to take a course in logic--
under their tutelage. Others have tried and failed to teach logical thinking by the use of such 
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excellent texts as Monroe Beardsley's Thinking Straight (1975) maintain a more skeptical 
position. Somehow many students seem not to improve their thinking through the formal study 
of logic. Sad experience has even led some to question whether formal logic has much to do with 
intelligent thinking. There appears to be some evidence that even very young children use 
inferential thinking, a form of logical thought, in the context of their everyday lives (Donaldson, 
1978); and that when adults respond in unexpected, apparently illogical ways to thought 
problems posed by academic researchers, it is because they conceptualize the demands of the 
problem differently, though not less logically, but of agreeing on the nature of the task. Olson 
(1977) cites research from which he infers that academic ways of thinking are often based upon a 
print culture whereas ordinary people may be responding in ways based upon their everyday 
experiences in an oral culture in which words do not signify meaning in the same way.  
 
 Questions have also been raised about an apparent overemphasis on a single kind of 
thinking. Some argue that we western intellectuals are in thrall to left-brain centered modes of 
discursive logical thought, neglecting the non-discursive symbolic, intuitive, gestalt-like activity 
of the right brain. Those in reaction against domination by scientific, rational thought argue that 
other kinds of thought are appropriate for artistic and religious thinking. This sort of argument is 
not new. It has never been stated more brilliantly than by the mathematician Pascal: “The heart 
has its reasons which the reason cannot know.” 
 
 In the face of all such considerations, we in ADAPT find persuasive the case made by 
Piaget that there is a common thread in all human cognitive activity that can best be described as 
something very like logic. In dozens of books and hundreds of articles over the last half-century 
and more, Piaget has elaborated his theories about the nature of knowledge and formal properties 
of the mechanisms by which knowledge is acquired at different stages in human development. 
Two of the stages of cognitive development that he describes are of interest to us as teachers of 
college-aged students, the concrete operational stage and the formal operational stage. At each 
stage certain structures of intelligence enable their possessors to interact with their experience of 
the world in certain ways. The possibilities for constructing and testing meaning are more limited 
at the former stage than at the latter, which is why developmental to the latter stage must be 
considered desirable.  
 
 Piaget's description of the cognitive structures distinctive to formal operational thought is 
presented in elegant symbolic-logic notation (Inhelder and Piaget 1958). It is, however, no more 
than a highly abstract hypothetical model of thought structures. Though one may be tempted to 
take this model of thought structures to be a description of how human thinking actually gets 
thought, this would be an error. Thought is always a specific activity going on in an incredibly 
complex way, embedded in the total context of an ongoing reality. No successful description of 
thought processes has yet been formulated. Consider the failure of the information processing 
school of cognitive psychologists to construct computer programs to simulate the thought of 
humans engaged in a relatively simple activity such as chess. A prodigious effort has produced 
fine chess programs that can defeat all but a fraction of one percent of all the world's chess 
players. No mean accomplishment. Interestingly, however, these computer chess programs do 
not “think” like people. They play excellent chess, but they do not play chess the way that people 
play it. The knowledge that would enable programmers to simulate human chess thinking still 
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eludes them, with no breakthrough in sight. In the same fashion, metaphorical thinking, so 
important to model-making in science and to creativity in art, defies human understanding. 
 
 If no model, including Piaget's, adequately explains what going on in human thinking, is 
it because the common strand that Piaget proposes in all cognitive activity does not really exist? 
Shall we believe, rather, that highly general rules something like those Piaget describes operate 
to create the regularity we observe everywhere in human activity? As a student of literature, I am 
aware of W. H. Auden's warning, “Thou shalt not commit a social science.” But we need all the 
help we can get, and if a psychologist and genetic epistemologist seems to offer assistance, I am 
for accepting it gratefully. 
 
 In a confusing world, folk wisdom has neatly summed up two partially valid but 
conflicting insights. One folk saying would have it that “one man's meat is another man's 
poison”; another tells us that “what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.” We in ADAPT 
have aligned ourselves with the “sauce for everybody” crowd. We are impressed by the 
accumulating evidence showing that perhaps fifty percent of American college freshmen do not 
characteristically perform at the formal operational level (for citations see J. L. Petr's Chapter 6). 
If we were taking the view of the “one man's meat” school, we might conclude that this does not 
matter, since those students may have talents in others directions. On the other hand, those of us 
in the “sauce for everybody” school wish to weight the consequences of the absence of formal 
operational thinking before acquiescing to that absence with equanimity. The topic is 
unfortunately too complex to explore in this context; the interested reader will find some of the 
issues discussed in Wayne Booth, Modern Dogma and the Rhetoric of Assent (1974). His 
general position, which I find persuasive, is that the consequence of denying the efficacy of 
reason in such non-scientific activities as the making of moral and aesthetic judgments is 
intellectual helplessness. It seems evident that the thinking involved in the sorts of judgments 
Booth describes is of the kind described by Piaget as formal operational thinking. In a 
democratic society in which it is assumed that all citizens should participate in determining the 
policies that affect their welfare, the desirability of all citizens exercising the most mature 
thought of which they are capable also seems evident. 
 
 Piaget's cognitive developmental theory serves as our guide in constructing an 
instructional program designed to encourage growth toward mature thought in all students. We 
accept as a working hypothesis Piaget's claim that self-regulating reversible cognitive structures 
are central to all mature thought (Piaget, 1970). That is Piaget's claim about the nature of 
knowing. A second claim we accept is that every individual in the course of growing up 
progresses through the same cognitive developmental stages in the same invariant sequence. I 
explore implications of these claims in the remainder of this essay. 
 
 It has been mentioned that according to Piaget a person at a lower stage of cognitive 
development is the master of less powerful structures of thinking than a person at a higher stage. 
It is for this reason that a person's stage of development acts as an upper limit on the person's 
ability to learn certain kinds of rules and strategies for ordering and testing experiences, that is, 
to understand. According to Piaget, developmental level explains why a person learns, or fails to 
learn. This view, to quote Piaget, “is contrary to the widely held opinion that development is a 
sum of discrete learning experiences” (Piaget, 1964, p. 176). For Piaget, development is a 
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process which concerns the totality of structures of knowledge. Factors that contribute to this 
developmental totality include biological maturation, experience of the physical world, 
interaction with other people (social transmission), and the active structuring that Piaget calls 
self-regulation. Learning, on the other hand, he defines as a response to a specific occasion. 
Development is spontaneous, an outcome of living. Learning, in contrast, is provoked -- by a 
teacher or by an experience. Intentional learning, and learning that results from intentional 
teaching, then, do contribute to development, but only in a limited way, whereas development 
has everything to say about what can be learned. If this Piagetian view is accepted, one must be 
very concerned about cognitive development, for development has a fundamental and crucial 
relation to learning. 
 
 In Piaget's view, then, both development and learning are the result of activity by the 
student, development a process concerned with total structures which are self-regulating and 
reversible, and learning a more isolated response to a specific situation. The self-regulation 
occurs as people mentally transform experience from one form to another and back again, 
seeking to build coherent mental structures. Our effort as teachers interested in development 
must be to challenge students constantly to transform the objects of their knowledge in various 
ways. A consequence is that we prefer classroom strategies calling for students to be active 
rather than passive. Students in ADAPT often complain that they do a lot of writing. They do 
write a lot. We try to convince them -- with what success you can imagine -- that it is the non-
ADAPT students, who have fewer opportunities to write, who should complain. In journals and 
formal papers, students are asked to formulate and reformulate their ideas about the material 
under study. Most of the writing is read and commented on, but not graded, since the motive 
behind the assignments is to promote development, which is a spontaneous process, rather than 
learning, which is provoked. Development follows its own path according to the precise 
challenge to present cognitive structures that a given individual finds in a particular experience. 
Journal entries and spontaneous comments in class reveal strange twists and turns of student 
thinking that no teacher could have predicted but that are necessary to the student attempting to 
build coherent structures out of experience. We wish to reward students for their efforts to work 
out the problems of understanding that they themselves recognize and confront, for that is the 
path of development.  
 
 In thus being concerned with fostering development, we course do not dismiss the 
importance for students of working out the sort of problems conventionally posed by text or 
teacher--the path of learning. Our design in ADAPT is to strike a balance between activities 
designed to foster development and the imposed tasks intended to inculcate learning in the 
traditional sense. 
 
 There is no question that our interest in development has resulted in a reduction of the 
amount of material given the students to be learned, which in fact indicates in brief the answer to 
the question of my title: An emphasis on development must come at the price of a de-emphasis 
of traditional learning. Hence, from the traditional viewpoint, development and learning must be 
viewed as conflicting goals. From the Piagetian view, on the other hand, whatever developmental 
gains students make will remain with them after specific learning is forgotten and will 
furthermore permit qualitatively more advanced kinds of learning in the future. The sacrifice of 
some learning activity in favor of developmental activity is therefore for the Piagetian no 
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sacrifice at all, but the achievement of a desirable balance productive of long-term benefits. In 
this view development and learning will be complementary goals.  
 
 Besides suggesting strategies for encouraging development, Piagetian theory indicates to 
us that college students will successfully perform tasks which calls for concrete operational 
thinking. For example, in many standard composition texts, one finds a division into sections 
devoted to specific organizing strategies, one of which is usually comparison and contrast. Now 
comparison and contrast are essentially classifying activities, which Piagetian theory tells us that 
people acquire in the concrete operational stage, falling normally somewhere between the sixth 
and twelfth year. Thus, from the Piagetian point of view, it would be extremely odd if 
comparison and contrast should strike any college student as new and exciting possibilities. It 
seems in our view to make better sense not to pretend to teach students how to use comparison 
and contrast but rather to find situations in which the activity of classifying according to 
comparisons and contrasts will seem to them inevitably appropriate, and then to let them have at 
it. Such a situation arises in Hemingway's Farewell to Arms when Frederic Henry holds forth 
about abstract and concrete terms, saying that the former are “obscene” and that only the latter 
“have dignity.” Students asked to pick words from the passage for someone to write on the board 
and then to suggest groupings for the words have never failed to group the words under the 
headings “abstract” and “concrete,” or to list as alternative headings for the two columns 
“obscene words” and “words having dignity.” These students are employing the concrete 
operational scheme of multiplicative classification, of which comparison and contrast of classes 
is an instance. 
 
 Most examples of situations calling for classification are less neat than the Hemingway 
one. Discourse ordinarily contains an abundance of cues indicating the organization of ideas. The 
classifying activity called for in understanding the order of a passage can be quite subtle and still 
be within the capacities of students. Students usually find it an interesting challenge to puzzle out 
the organization of a jumbled passage. One that has worked well is the “lunatic, lover, and poet” 
speech in A Midsummer Night's Dream. We break this speech down into phrasal units, print the 
units on three by five cards, jumble the order, and ask students to work in groups of five or so to 
put the speech back in order. The abundance of cues at first results in conflicting suggestions, but 
within about a half hour each group settles on a defensible order, and it will be a rare class in 
which at least one of the groups does not come up with the order Shakespeare used. During the 
remainder of the class period the groups compare versions and discuss the pros and cons of each. 
A consensus almost always develops in favor of the order of the original. We believe that 
Piaget's theory indicates this outcome.  
 
 We share with the conventional handbooks the goal of encouraging in our students the 
efficient, self-conscious employment of their organizational and presentational skills. Exercises 
of the sort described, in which students actively construct solutions according to abilities they 
already have, seem to us superior to the handbook way of working with the notions of 
comparison and contrast. By working with these exploratory exercises, students will, we believe, 
increase their control of a general strategy familiar to them from other contexts. 
 
 Besides suggesting to us exercises to cultivate strategies that concrete operational 
students should already posses, Piagetian theory suggests exercises calling for formal operational 
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strategies that many college students employ in rudimentary or incomplete fashion if at all. One 
example is the strategy of testing the truth of general propositions. Typical composition 
handbooks teach that every composition should have a clear thesis, which is usually explained to 
be a general proposition. By observing student strategies for deciding on the truth or 
propositions, Moshman and Thompson (1979) found evidence of developmental stages 
corresponding fairly closely to the Piagetian stages of concrete and formal operations. They 
presented a number of undergraduates with propositions such as “If a person uses fluoride 
toothpaste, she/he will have healthy teeth,” and then asked them what they would conclude from 
various kinds of evidence. They found that many of the students in their sample conferred the 
same proof-status on confirming examples as on disconfirming ones. For example, when asked 
what they could conclude from a case of a person who used fluoride toothpaste and had cavities, 
these students replied that they wanted to see more cases before drawing a conclusion. If 
presented with a preponderance of confirming cases they regarded the evidence as tending to 
confirm the truth of the proposition. Thus, the authors point out, confirming cases were regarded 
as having equal weight with disconfirming cases. 
 
 These findings suggest a Piagetian explanation of the strategy one finds many students 
wedded to when asked to write a paper with a general proposition for a thesis. Most handbooks 
advise students against making absolute generalizations, indicating that a common propensity to 
do so is recognized, though not many college students, one hopes, would defend a proposition in 
the precise form “If a person uses fluoride toothpaste, she/he will have health teeth.” But 
students do frequently in defending their general propositions use the tactic of presenting 
supporting evidence only. If questioned about this, I find that few students can think of any 
reason why they should want to bring up evidence calling their own proposition into question. 
Moshman and Thompson note that students who weigh confirming cases equally with 
disconfirming cases seem to assume a sort of democracy in the evidence, the majority rule 
determining truth. This is an indication of an immature or incomplete understanding of what 
makes propositions true or false. 
 
 Standard composition teaching normally fosters the strategy of defending propositions by 
advancing only supporting arguments. Whether intentionally or not, in encouraging such a view 
of rhetorical discourse such teaching caters to the established preference of concrete thinkers. 
Moshman and Thompson cite studies showing that science teaching also typically favors this 
same concrete operational way of thinking. We all probably recall from our days in science labs 
that the structure of the tasks given us encouraged us to report only the data that confirmed the 
scientific law we were studying. We tended either to disregard measurements that did not 
confirm the law, or to add in a fudge factor, Kelly's constant, or whatever it was called wherever 
you were a student, so that the figures came out “right.” 
 
 Our strategy in ADAPT classes is to attempt to undermine this assumption by treating all 
general propositions that we raise for investigation as hypothetical. In ADAPT English we have 
adopted a rhetoric text more in keeping than most with Piagetian constructivist epistemology. 
This text, Rhetoric: Discovery and Change by Young, Becker and Pike (1970), introduces an 
explicit ethical bias toward the rhetorical stance of sharing in a common search for truth. Instead 
of a thesis to defend, it advocates locating a problem to explore. It speaks rather of hypotheses 
than of theses. It urges the student to seek for competing or alternative explanations of 
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experience. Such a stance appeals to students who have reached the appropriate developmental 
stage. A study by Britton and others (1978, p. 97) reports: “A new element enters writing when 
the writer begins to inspect his generalizations and to make them the very subject of his 
discourse...Here the writer begins to consider alternative possibilities and perhaps to weight 
them.” A considerable portion of our students, however, approaching fifty percent, resist or fail 
to comprehend this stance -- as Piagetian theory predicts. Since students at the concrete 
operational level do not possess or have not mastered the strategy of systematically exploring all 
theoretically possible cases, for them to go on searching after having found a plausible position 
would be something of an unnatural act.  
 
 A low keyed but persistent questioning of the adequacy of their assumptions about truth-
status of propositions may help students to move to the next developmental level. This hope is 
encouraged by work done at Harvard by William G. Perry, Jr., (1970) who on the basis of 
extensive interviews of the same students at different points in their university careers elaborated 
a scheme of stages of intellectual and ethical development during the college years. Perry found 
many entering college student who typically think dualistically; for them every question has 
unequivocal right and wrong answers. College experiences, mostly outside of the classroom, but 
sometimes in humanities classes, gradually persuade most of them that such a conception is too 
simplistic, and their thinking moves toward relativism, a position in which “everyone is entitled 
to his own opinion,” and every answer is as good as any other. In later stages they develop 
criteria for deciding between better and worse propositions even when absolute judgment is 
untenable. Perry believes that in the most advanced stage, people accept the necessity of 
committing themselves to the best choice available; he names this “commitment within 
relativism.” The congruence with Piaget's theories is evident.  
 
 In the discussion so far I have assumed with Piaget that the characteristics of the concrete 
and formal stages of cognitive development manifest themselves in every discipline and function 
everywhere as a factor limiting what in every disciplinary be effectively taught. This assumption 
affords the English teacher a useful strategy for responding to colleagues in other disciplines on 
those frequent occasions when the charge is leveled: “If you people in English would quit 
teaching literature to your students and teach composition instead, they wouldn't come out of 
your courses unable to write a decent sentence.” It is true that ugly ducklings often come out of 
our courses without having undergone the transformation into swans, but there's a cognitive 
developmental explanation for this failing. It has long been claimed by serious students of the 
problem that good writing develops hand in hand with the general maturity of the individual 
(Kitzhaber, 1968). In Piagetian terms this is to say that a skill so intricate as the writing of good 
English prose may well require formal operational thought schemes. But it is necessary to 
translate this proposition into terms that science and math teachers can take to heart. We 
therefore ask our English students to perform a task involving proportional reasoning, which 
Piaget has identified as one of the schemes attained at the level of formal thought. The task we 
use in the Frog Puzzle devised by Robert Karplus at the University of California-Berkeley. This 
simple pencil and paper task takes only ten minutes or so of class time. The results in our 
freshman English classes, both in and out of the ADAPT program, have remained remarkably 
consistent over many years: only about one fourth of the students use proportional reasoning for 
the task. Most of the rest use additive reasoning, which Piaget describes as a concrete operational 
mode of thought, and some refuse to try at all, either on the grounds that the problem cannot be 
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solved or that they are simply no good at math. (Caution: a fair number of our colleagues and 
graduate students also fail to use proportional reasoning for this task. We do not therefore judge 
them to be concrete operational thinkers. More about that later.) Students at the University of 
Nebraska must have passed three years of high school mathematics to meet the entrance 
requirements. In those three years of math instruction they have unquestionably been taught 
proportional reasoning strategies time and time again. Yet many of them have failed to master 
this widely applicable math skill. Thus, we conclude, when our colleagues chide us for failing to 
teach writing skills, is it not a case of the pot calling the kettle black? 
 
 Through this gratifying counterattack we are able to make the serious point that neither 
English teacher nor math teacher is specifically to blame for student failings if those failing 
result from inadequate development of formal operational schemes. 
 
 Nevertheless it is only with extreme caution and with extensive reservations that one 
should venture upon this sort of explanation. Piaget's elegant description in The Growth of 
Logical Thinking of the concrete and formal stages of intellectual development invites the hoe 
that by administering Piagetian tasks one may determine a global stage of development of 
individual students. Experience has dashed this hope - happily, we think. It turns out that people 
often think formally on some tasks and concretely on others, their performances being 
influenced, apparent, by such diverse factors as motivation, familiarity, sand social conditioning 
(Piaget, 1972). Thus while a person maybe said to perform at a certain developmental level on a 
particular task, it is not possible to predict from that performance how the person will perform on 
other tasks, particularly when the tasks are in other disciplines.  
 
 It will be clear from these sketchy examples that working out some of the implications of 
Piagetian theory for an educational program such as ours offers us a continuing challenge. The 
theory perhaps does more to console us for some of our failures as teachers than to tell us how 
our failures may be overcome, for if the fault is in the developmental level that our students have 
attained, then the fault is not in us. Our teaching, Piaget tells us, can play a role in fostering 
development, but only a fairly limited role. On the other hand if we accept the challenge, we can 
be more than teachers; we can be the designers of activities that allow students to engage in the 
spontaneous transformations of objects in thought that are the very essence of knowledge. 
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